The Journal

BELLINGHAM

CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION

2003-2004

of the
Whatcom County Historical Society

Special Edition
Bellingham Centennial

In Cooperation with the
Center for Pacific Northwest Studies at
Western Washington University
Bellingham, Washington, April 2004
The Journal

of the
Whatcom County Historical Society

Special Commemorative Edition
Bellingham City Centennial

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Center for Pacific Northwest Studies at
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Preface and Acknowledgments

The essays in this volume represent the fruits of a collaborative effort among the Whatcom County Historical Society, Western Washington University, and the broader Bellingham community. In 2002, an ad hoc committee formed at Western to discuss ways in which the university might contribute to the Centennial of the City of Bellingham. The options were many, but given the university's mission— to promote undergraduate education and to seek ways to contribute to the surrounding community—the direct involvement of students in that process seemed to offer the best possibilities. Thinking along these lines, Elizabeth Joffrion (Head Archivist at Western's Center for Pacific Northwest Studies), Carole Morris (on behalf of the Whatcom County Historical Society), Kevin Leonard (from the Department of History at Western), and I developed and instituted a plan: In the summer of 2003, Kevin Leonard offered a course on regional and local history that focused on Bellingham in the twentieth century. Over the course of nine weeks, students in the class developed their own research topics, collaboratively researched certain areas (such as city crime records and 1920s Bellingham newspapers), and ultimately drew up drafts of their own research. Off and on in that process I joined the class, though Professor Leonard and the students did all the real work. Our goal was to bring as many of the student papers forward for publication as possible. This, we believed, would make a contribution to the students’ education and to the community.

While Professor Leonard and his students spent hours on their tasks, Elizabeth Joffrion and Carole Morris collaborated with the Whatcom County Historical Society to arrange for a special issue of the Journal of the Whatcom County Historical Society devoted to the students' work. The Board of the Whatcom County Historical Society generously agreed to open these pages to the students and all of us involved in the project are indebted to them for doing so.

Through the fall and early winter, I edited the students' work and, in my own fashion, continued thinking about Bellingham's first
century. Not every student who participated in the class was able to translate a seminar paper into a publication. It is a long and difficult process and the students have many priorities. As the volume came together, I reached back into my files to the work of Robert Wayne Parker, a former student whom I had encouraged to publish in the Journal and whose work seemed to fit nicely into this current slate of articles. Professor Leonard offered up his reflections on the relationship between local and academic historians (and what they produce), what directions might be fruitful for further consideration, and how the students' work would fit into those areas. I developed some reflections on those points and posed a potential way of thinking about and organizing the history of Bellingham's first century. I have learned much from the students and Professor Leonard in the process of editing these articles and writing about Bellingham. For that I am grateful. We all have much to learn from Bellingham's first century, but those of us involved in this issue hope that we have made some contribution to what promises to be a fruitful and lively conversation.

This volume would not have come together were it not for the hard work, dedication, and persistence of all parties named above. Kevin Leonard and the students spent many, many hours on their articles. Elizabeth Joffrion kept open the lines of communication among the different parties involved and did her best to keep the project on schedule. Carole Morris, Matt Aamot, and others in the Whatcom County Historical Society have offered nothing but encouragement and, especially in the case of Carole Morris, a significant amount of their time and energies.

Western's financial support has been important, too. The Center for Pacific Northwest Studies (with support from the John and LaRee Caughey Foundation), the Department of History, the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Bureau for Faculty Research, have helped subsidize this effort. I must reserve, however, my most profound gratitude to Fred Kullman. I first met Fred several years ago when he enrolled as a SPAN (non-matriculated community access) student in one of my courses. As a retiree, Fred determined to utilize Western in his own quest for lifelong learning. Fred was a
welcomed participant in my class and always eager to engage in a lively discussion about issues. Unbeknownst to me, Fred had a habit of making adonation to the university in recognition of what his courses meant to him. As I recall, he gave generously to support student scholarships in the Department of History at the time. It was a happy coincidence, then, when the Western Foundation alerted Fred to this project in 2003. His early offer of support inspired us in the planning stages and convinced us that such a project could succeed. Those of us appearing in this volume and involved in its creation wish to offer our heartfelt thanks. What Fred gave us cannot be measured in the accountant's columns.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the contributions of the many institutions that contributed to this volume. The City of Bellingham, Bellingham Public Library, the Whatcom Museum of History & Art, the Northwest Region State Archives, Wilson Library at Western Washington University, and Fairhaven College, knowingly and unknowingly supported student research and fostered a sense of an intellectual community. While the contributions of people at these institutions are nothing new, it is always gratifying to witness the process.

Finally, I must state that any successes in this volume should be attributed to Elizabeth Joffrion, Carole Morris, the Whatcom County Historical Society, Kevin Leonard, Christina Claussen, Melissa Mabee, Robert Wayne Parker, and James Hillegas. Shortcomings, omissions, and errors can and should be attributed to me. I can only offer that this experience has convinced me that there are many, many projects to be done and that I look forward to future opportunities for more "history in the making."

Chris Friday
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January 2004
2020 Preface

Little did the students, archivists, and professors involved in this volume know at the time of its publication that so many of the topics would continue to speak to us in such profound ways more than a decade and a half later. Clausen's examination of the uncertainty of medical treatments early in the last century still resonates today. Parker's study women workers in World War II not only addresses issues of women's equality but also fair and living wages, points we're still debating. Hillegas's essay reminds us of the huge impact of federal spending on infrastructure, its social and environmental impact, and longer-term consequences regarding global warming, federal spending (or lack thereof) and so much more. All those are important, but Mabee's substantial exploration of the impact of the 1918-1919 Spanish Influenza on Bellingham stands out as an eerie reminder of how much and how little has changed between then and the COVID-19 public health crisis raging around us today, which is why we have provided it for you today in full courtesy of the Whatcom County Historical Society.

While it might be tempting to read this and the other essays in this issue of the journal as a frustrating example of how little things seem to have changed over the past century, perhaps we would all be well served if we realized that those who have come before us also faced substantial crises and found ways forward, imperfect as they may have been. This is not "history repeating itself" as is so often glibly said, but an example of causes and effects or consequences (the basic principle of history) and the reminder that the effects or consequences solve some issues but create or highlight new ones.

Finally, this essay and its companions in the Journal of the Whatcom County Historical Society are strong reminders of the work that undergraduate students can and do produce in the History Department at Western Washington University.

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June 2020

For back issues of the Journal of the Whatcom Historical Society, including this one, please visit:
http://www.whatcomhistory.net/journals.html
"Like the Grasshoppers Do Upon Kansas": Spanish Influenza on the Home Front in Bellingham, Washington, 1918-1919

Melissa Mabee

On October 7, 1918, the Bellingham Board of Health confirmed the first two reported cases of Spanish influenza in the city. Alarmed at the outbreak, Mayor John Sells issued a "closing order" shutting down all indoor public gathering places indefinitely. The mayor's order was broad and included churches, schools, athletic facilities, theaters, pool and card room, dance halls, and even "funerals of a public nature." Such orders were not uncommon. The virulent strain of influenza that first reached the East Coast of the United States via a troop transport ship on September 1, 1918, had already spread to Seattle by September 17. Within days, officials there reported hundreds of cases among military personnel and civilians. By October 5, Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson issued a closing order for his city. Bellingham's closing order was not just mimicry of its larger counterpart to the south, but an earnest attempt by public officials to take action against an epidemic whose etiology they—and their counterparts across the country—scarcely understood.

During the first two weeks under the closing order, the number of influenza cases in Bellingham expanded precipitously. On October 14, a student at the Bellingham State Normal School became the city's first influenza-related death. Daily counts of new cases continued to swell, peaking on October 21 with 153 cases for that day alone. Although new incidents of influenza declined thereafter, on November 4 city officials implemented a state-mandated "masking order." Police set about arresting, jailing, and fining all persons in public places without approved gauze masks, as well as those wearing them "improperly." Within three days, however, the mayor re-
scinded the city masking order, World War I ended, and the epidemic appeared to have passed.⁸

Lulled into a sense of security, Bellingham residents were surprised by a resurgence of the Spanish influenza epidemic in late November and throughout December. On December 4, 1918, the Board of Health issued a quarantine order for all those infected with the illness, as well as all members of their households, with the exception of undiagnosed heads of households.⁹ When quarantine failed to stem the tide, Mayor Sells issued a second closing order, but not another masking order.¹⁰ By mid-January 1919, the second and final wave of the epidemic subsided in Bellingham, though a few new cases and flu-related pneumonia deaths persisted into March. Bellingham City Health Officer Dr. W. W. Ballaine declared that the Spanish influenza"[c]ame down upon the universe like the grasshoppers do upon Kansas, and... it will go the same way. No quarantines, no regulation can overcome the epidemic."¹¹ Ballaine's comments not only suggest the helplessness felt by many in Bellingham and around the globe as they faced this horrifyingly virulent epidemic, but also a newly found cynicism regarding the wisdom of local officials and government regulation in general. Indeed, Bellingham's officials and residents responded differently to the two phases of the epidemic. How they did so reveals much about the limits of authority and power in the relatively new government of a small city at the height of the Progressive Era.¹²

Moreover, a case study of Bellingham's response to the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918-1919 demonstrates that it was not simply a local event battled by heroic but overwhelmed public health officials and the medical community in large cities, nor that it was a purely global event. The case of Bellingham offers glimpses into how the local and extralocal interact, and how local populations filtered national and international events through their own lenses. It is also representative of how quickly the social and political context can shift, thereby reminding historians of how the close study of a place can provide a context for much broader studies. For as large an event as it was and for as much as it provides historical context for very recent epidemics, the scholarly historical literature on the Spanish influenza is
surprisingly limited in scope and number. Historians' book-length accounts of the influenza pandemic tend to examine its effects on a large scale. Alfred Crosby, in *Epidemic and Peace, 1918*, provides the most comprehensive and authoritative work on the epidemic in the United States. Richard Collier, in *The Plague of the Spanish Lady*, uses the personal remembrances of survivors to tell the tale of the Spanish flu as a world pandemic in a popular history format. Read side-by-side, Crosby and Collier create a vivid picture of the devastation caused by the 1918 pandemic, both from a public health perspective as well as in the lives of individuals.

Unlike Crosby and Collier, who focus on the global impact of the Spanish influenza, most authors remain content to assess the epidemic within the United States at regional, state, county and local levels. Those authors tend to frame their studies in similar terms—overwhelmed public health and medical services, overflowing morgues, and emergency measures taken at local and state levels to control the spread of the disease. These narratives of the influenza epidemic almost invariably present government officials and the medical community as the primary actors in local flu stories, doing their utmost to stop the spread of influenza and aid those stricken by it. Most of these state, regional or local histories of the influenza epidemic also utilize a narrowly local view, drawing almost exclusively on local sources, especially newspapers and statements issued by government and health officials. These studies localize the influenza epidemic in other ways, particularly by focusing closely on the epidemic and public health approaches to it and only incidentally bringing the considerable effects of World War I and life under wartime conditions into the story.

While state and regional studies have touched upon the special problems faced by small towns and rural communities, studies of individual cities are concerned primarily with major metropolitan areas. Accounts of the flu in Seattle, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Chicago are certainly valuable, but the effect of the epidemic on smaller cities remains largely unexplored. Richard H. Peterson and Bradford Luckingham, in writing about San Diego (pop. 70,000) and Tucson (pop. 20,000) respectively, are exceptions, but both of their studies
focus narrowly on local public health ordinances, such as restrictions on public gatherings and the mandatory wearing of gauze surgical masks. Although Bellingham, with its population of approximately 25,500, was large enough at the time of the epidemic to have its own Board of Health, it is also small enough to be ignored by historians studying the emergence of public health and the ways entire communities respond to crises.

For Bellingham residents, the epidemic was not strictly a local event. They developed their frame of reference within multiple layers of international, national, regional, and local events. The war and its attending home front anxieties, class tensions so apparent in the region's extractive economy, and fear of "foreign elements" as their own "contagions" all set the stage for how Bellingham residents understood the Spanish influenza and how they responded to public health officials. The illnesses and deaths of friends or loved ones far away directly affected many Bellingham residents. For the friends and families of young men in the military, influenza was cause for anxiety; soldiers did not have to travel across the Atlantic to die quickly and in large numbers. Throughout 1918, the Bellingham newspapers reported the war in Europe and urged those at home to work and make sacrifices for the war effort. Both the Bellingham Herald and Bellingham Rev- eille featured virulently anti-German news and propaganda, and Liberty Loan drive advertisements graphically portrayed the "fiendishness of the Hun." If each American did his or her part, these stories and advertisements suggested, the Allied victory could be won much sooner, with the lives of ever "doughboys" lost. Syndicated stories portrayed the patriotism of individual Americans—afarmer with eleven sons in the Army who wished he had more to send; a legless man who spent what little he had on war bonds—as examples to be followed. News of patriotic rallies, Liberty Loan drives, and meetings of wartime clubs such as the Sammy Girls and the Patriotic League appeared frequently; there was no shortage of ways to publicly display individual and community patriotism.

For men between the ages of 21 and 40, registering for the draft was their first duty in the war effort. Although the newly created Se-
lective Service emphasized voluntary draft registration in publicity campaigns, registration was mandatory. Many young men in Whatcom County were eager to join the fight even though some were still too young for the draft. The latter simply enlisted directly in the Army or Navy. *The Herald* regularly carried photos of local servicemen on the front page, and in doing so not only kept the community informed of which young men had gone to war, but also offered a pointed reminder to other men that they, too, should be willing to go. The *Herald* and *Reveille* almost never published photos of local people and events, and only the most important national or world figures appeared on the front page. Placing images of young local men alongside those of the Kaiser or Woodrow Wilson magnified their importance, granting farm boys, mill hands and store clerks the status of national, as well as local, heroes. News and advertising described the bravery of American soldiers as they faced hardship and death, underscoring the difference between the men who went to war and those who did not.

If the ultimate patriotic duty for young men was to fight on the Western Front (or at least show an appropriate willingness to do so), for women it was to support those men through work on the home front. Many nurses went to Europe to work in field hospitals, but for most American women "war work" was also "women's work," performed both at home and in community gatherings. In Bellingham, Red Cross volunteers met to make bandages, knit socks and sweaters, and sew pneumonia jackets and gauze surgical masks. Patriotic duty also combined with enthusiasm for the outdoors as hikers gathered sphagnum moss in local woods; female Red Cross workers sewed the cleaned and dried moss between layers of gauze to make absorbent surgical dressings.

Throughout the war, the federal Food Administration reminded housewives and other cooks to do their part by using less wheat flour and sugar, and finding room in their diet for more potatoes and wheat substitutes. Newspapers and national magazines, such as *Good Housekeeping*, stressed the conservation of rationed foodstuffs and offered recipes adapted to substitute ingredients. Wartime conserva-
tion ordinances issued by the Food Administration required households and restaurants to purchase one pound of com, rye or barley flour for each pound of wheat. Women who bought their bread from local bakers brought home hefty "War-" or "Liberty Bread," in which rye, com, barley or a combination of these replaced twenty percent of the wheat flour. Baskets of crackers disappeared from hotel and restaurant tables, as did liver and bacon, and the Food Administration encouraged "Meatless Mondays." Conserving wheat, sugar, meat and cooking fats at home meant American boys overseas would not have to do without; formerly simple decisions about what to make for dinner could potentially win or lose a war.

By the spring of 1918, diversion of new wool to military use meant growing shortages of woolens for civilian clothing, and Bellingham department stores such as J.B. Wahl exhorted customers to buy wool coats while they still could. "It is useless to reiterate that in suit or coat buying there are advantages possible this season which cannot be promised for next year, on account of difficulty in securing woolen fabrics," the ad copy read, and this was not simply a scare tactic to sell more coats. During most of 1918, it was widely believed that the war could drag on for years to come. That autumn and winter, the scarcity of new wool cloth was seen in the Herald's "Daily Fashion Hint," which by then featured coats made from velvet, plush and silk alternatives.

Despite wartime restrictions on food and the diversion of wool to military use, people in Bellingham, as in the rest of the United States, did not face empty store shelves, nor did they have to stand in line for rations. Even with restrictions on certain goods, they went without very little compared to European civilians, and the press offered constant reminders of how fortunate Americans were. At the same time, nobody knew when the war would end or how much more might be asked of those on the home front before it was over. The unusually cold winter of 1917-1918 not only brought ice storms and at least one "silver thaw" to western Washington that downed power lines and made roads impassable; it also brought shortages of heating fuels. The federal Fuel Administration and the Washington State Coun-
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cil of Defense issued emergency orders limiting business hours in order to conserve coal and wood. Bellingham business owners were clearly unhappy with the order; an editorial in the *Reveille* urged them to show their patriotism through sacrifice and "teamwork" by giving the early closing order a "fair trial." Refusing to obey the order, the editorial threatened, would brand a business as unpatriotic; it was better to cooperate now than lose customers later. 27 Although the Food Administration imposed strict wartime limits on retail food prices, they soared; eggs sold for sixty cents a dozen by September 1918, and jumped to seventy-five cents the following January, even after the war ended. A two-pound brick of butter sold for $1.40 at a time when, despite high wartime wages, most common laborers still made less than fifty cents an hour. 28

Not all of the battles fought in 1918 and 1919 were on the Western Front; even as the press waged a patriotic booster campaign, deep and bitter conflicts brewed at home. Both press and public denounced draft-age men who failed to register with the Selective Service as "slackers," and local authorities made arrests in occasional, well-publicized "slacker raids." An estimated twelve percent of all men eligible for conscription either did not register or did not respond when summoned by local draft boards, despite a penalty of three years in federal prison if caught and convicted. 29 Some who registered fled to Canada when their draft numbers came up; newspaper editorials accused them of treason, demanding harsh punishment for those who dared return. In May 1918, the Selective Service issued a "work or fight" order, under which unemployed men moved to the top of draft lists, followed by those in "non-useful" jobs. Bartenders, theater ushers, professional athletes, elevator operators, club attendants, entertainers and race track workers, as well as "idlers" across all social classes, were required to join the ranks of scarce factory and agricultural labor, or else risk conscription. 30 By September, the sports section had disappeared from newspapers, as enforcement of the order pressed professional athletes into war work or the military. Conscientious objectors fared no better than slackers in both press and public opinion; to openly choose not to join the fight exposed
them to accusations of treason, vigilante violence, and prosecution in military courts. In April, 1918, Bellingham Mayor John Sells forbade the pacifistic International Bible Students' Association to hold a meeting at the American Theater. The Association's leaders insisted that their refusal to fight was a matter of conscience, based on their interpretation of the Bible. They also emphasized that they were "not pro-German enemies of the government, and [did] not disseminate sedition," but Mayor Sells cited legitimate fears of vigilante violence.

Newspaper and popular accusations of treason and "pro-German" tendencies not only branded draft dodgers, slackers and conscientious objectors, but I.W.W. members and Socialist labor leaders as well. The federal government, industry, and the press accused labor organizers of undermining wartime productivity on the home front by sowing discontent among workers and encouraging them to strike. Anti-I.W.W. stories appeared frequently, as did other stories of labor unrest, but not all rhetoric against labor was specifically against "Wobblies" and "Bolsheviks." One editorial in the Reveille denounced "Industrial Slackers"-factory workers who received unprecedentedly high wartime wages, but only worked as much as they had to in order to live "at their accustomed level." Uninspired by the chance to work six or even seven days a week and save their earnings, many were content to work only four or five days. "Such persons are not Americans in spirit though they may have the right of franchise," the editorialist fumed; "They are kaiserites pure and simple and they are working in the interest of the kaiser, whether it is by direction of a tool of Germany or through their own base course of economic reasoning."

With so much news of the war in Europe, and sacrifice and conflicts at home, the Bellingham papers did not report the earliest days of the Spanish influenza epidemic. It was an event too distant and, given the gravity of the war and all its attendant anxieties, too inconsequential to note at first. The flu arrived in the States via Boston harbor around the first of September, aboard a transport ship full of doughboys returning from France. It spread rapidly among army camps on the East Coast, aided by overcrowded conditions and constantly shifting, mobile populations. By mid-September, the flu had traveled across
the country on trains crowded with soldiers and sailors on their way to and from military bases. News of the epidemic first made the Bellingham papers on September 14, when the nationwide death toll from influenza and flu-related pneumonia began to rise rapidly. While the Bellingham Herald and Reveille reported these stories, they did so only incidentally; the flu rarely merited more than a couple of paragraphs relegated to the back pages, with headlines set in small type. War news- battles, political maneuverings, and casualty lists-was of paramount interest, and the few scattered flu-related statistics may have made the epidemic seem both distant and non-threatening. For weeks, the public health catastrophe created by the flu in Eastern cities went virtually unreported.

On September 28, the number of reported influenza cases in army camps hit 30,000, with 5,000 new cases reported on September 26 alone; on the same day, Congress passed an emergency measure appropriating $1 million to fight the epidemic. The Bellingham Herald gave each of these stories less than two column inches. The next news of the epidemic's progress, reported in the Herald on October 4, rated only a short article on an inside page, despite the "Influenza Spreads Alarmingly" headline. The Reveille, on the same day, reported that Pennsylvania and Delaware had enacted "closing orders," shutting all public places to prevent the further spread of the epidemic. In spite of the 113,737 reported cases of influenza in army camps alone, with 8,575 cases of pneumonia and 2,479 deaths and the ever-westward march of the epidemic-New Mexico and Arizona had also reported their first cases-local papers continued to portray it as a distant event.

Still, Spanish influenza spread rapidly to the West Coast, aided by the widespread movement of troops from one infected military camp to another. The flu arrived by train in Seattle on September 17, along with several hundred Navy draftees from Philadelphia. Bound for the Naval Training Center at the University of Washington, eleven of these men were ill upon arrival. The epidemic reached Camp Lewis at about the same time, and by September 20 there were 173 known cases. While Puget Sound military bases quickly put quaran-
times into effect, forbidding soldiers and sailors from leaving, no similar measures were taken against civilians entering the camps. On September 23, 10,000 civilians gathered at Camp Lewis to watch the review of the Washington State National Guard Infantry. Two days later—coinciding neatly with the flu's two- to five-day incubation period—the first influenza cases appeared among Seattle's civilian population.39

Across the country, state and local public health officials were slow to respond given the easy transmission of Spanish influenza and its rapid spread among exposed populations. A massive public health crisis already confronted Boston, New York and Philadelphia, and while the worst was yet to come, the experiences of affected cities already suggested that this was not the usual flu.40 What most hindered public health officials' ability to prepare for the epidemic, however, was a lack of reliable information. In its September 28 issue, the Journal of the American Medical Association claimed that "Spanish" influenza was the same old flu under a different name, and "should not cause any greater importance to be attached to it, nor arouse any greater fear" than previous influenza outbreaks.41 Surgeon General Rupert Blue, in a bulletin for physicians published in the September 20 issue of Science, did not raise any alarm. Quarantine was "impracticable," he noted, but infection could be avoided by staying away from crowds, wearing a gauze mask while attending infected persons, and educating the public "as regards the danger of promiscuous coughing and spitting." Blue also noted a tendency for patients to develop pneumonia, but otherwise presented Spanish influenza as a bacterial infection that could be controlled through careful hygienic practices and avoidance of direct contact with the sick.42 Not until 1933 would researchers identify the true causative agent of influenza as an airborne virus.43

When the first Spanish influenza cases appeared in western Washington State, public health officials did not act immediately, but considering the Surgeon General's statement and the apparent lack of concern expressed in JAMA, they were ill-equipped to fully understand the virulence and severity of the epidemic. Updated information
was slow in coming; *JAMA, Science,* and *The Survey* did not publish any further stories on the influenza epidemic until mid-October, well into the region's own rising wave of cases.\(^{44}\)

Faced with 700 cases of influenza at the University of Washington's Naval Training Center, and a rapidly growing number of civilian cases, Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson issued a closing order on October 5, shutting down churches, schools, theaters and other indoor public gathering places.\(^{45}\) The following day, after seven flu-related deaths occurred at the Naval Training Center, the epidemic made the front page of the *Bellingham Herald* for the first time. In an editorial on the spread of the epidemic, the *Reveille* noted its "most disquieting" death rate. The author viewed closing Seattle as necessary and reflected wartime attitudes by observing, "it is a case where the price of the nation's health lies in the vigilance of the authorities and the people co-operating with the authorities."\(^{46}\)

When the first known flu cases appeared in Bellingham, most of the town's residents cooperated with authorities. Mayor John Sells called a special evening meeting of the city council on October 7, after the Bellingham Board of Health confirmed two local cases of Spanish influenza, and he and the council issued an immediate closure order for the city. Following the example set by other cities across the nation, the order closed all schools, churches, theaters, pool and card rooms, dance halls and other indoor gathering places indefinitely. Local movie and vaudeville theaters voluntarily shut down at 9 p.m., shortly after the meeting adjourned. The following day, when the closure order formally went into effect, the YMCA and YWCA both closed their facilities; only the YWCA cafeteria remained open to the public. President G W. Nash of the Bellingham State Normal School issued a statement advising students to remain in Bellingham despite the suspension of classes. The Board of Health also requested "that all funerals of a public nature be dispensed with for the present." During the closed period, according to local funeral director Arthur C. Harlow, "all funerals will be strictly private." Only immediate family members could attend funerals, and funeral services had to be held outdoors, usually at graveside. Social and fraternal clubs cancelled
indoor meetings, but outdoor gatherings and activities such as group hikes continued. 47

Most businesses, however, remained open under the order. Grocery stores, the Public Market at Magnolia and Dock Streets, clothing and shoe stores, barber shops, pharmacies, hotels, and restaurants all remained open. Adams' Style Shop, a men's clothier, held the grand opening of their new store at Elk and Holly Streets on October 11, with a 10-piece orchestra to entertain the crowds. The Reveille commented on how the attendees "disregard[ed] the blustering weather," but not how they disregarded the risk of infection and the ban on public gatherings. 48 Workers in banks and offices downtown still reported for work, as did the employees of the Bloedel-Donovan mills, Pacific American Fisheries, and other local industries. Streetcars ran at normal capacity, and travelers could freely enter or leave the city by train, which was probably the way Spanish influenza arrived in Bellingham. On the same day Bellingham officials announced the first local influenza cases, the Herald mentioned an unidentified mother and son stricken by the flu at Brennan, "a short distance from Ferndale on the Great Northern." 49

Closing movie theaters and churches but not clothing stores and public transportation ultimately failed to prevent transmission of the influenza virus, but it made sense to public health officials who thought they were dealing with a common bacterial infection. Advice on how to avoid infection usually suggested "[breathing] pure air as much as possible," keeping windows open for proper ventilation, and trying to avoid breathing air others had just exhaled or standing too close to others while talking. 50 Preventing crowds from gathering in close proximity for extended periods of time, often in overheated and poorly-ventilated buildings shut tight against winter cold and rain, the Bellingham Board of Health, like other public health offices across the country, believed they could control the epidemic.

Two new cases appeared in Bellingham on October 9, but the Herald reported that the disease was "developing slowly" and all five cases were safely under a physician's care. 51 The following day, city Health Officer Ballaine, who had probably read JA.M4’s dismissal of
Spanish influenza as a serious threat, insisted that it was just the usual "grippe," despite its tendency to develop complications such as pneumonia. Even with twelve cases in Bellingham, the Herald optimistically claimed that Seattle's situation was improving; of the 1,283 reported cases, only seven people had died and each new case seemed to be matched with a recovery. Although the influenza epidemic was no longer a distant event, the Bellingham Board of Health remained confident that it had matters well in hand. The Reveille published an article by local physician E.F. Larkin, describing the symptoms of Spanish influenza and giving practical advice on how to treat it. Board of Health members issued a list of simple precautions against infection, encouraging people to stay away from crowds and use a handkerchief to cover the mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing. Existing ordinances against spitting on sidewalks, they warned, would be enforced. Bellingham's public health officials continued to portray the flu as only a minor threat, even as Seattle reported 313 new cases of the flu on October 9 and banned outdoor gatherings as well. When 36 new cases were reported in Bellingham on October 10, the news appeared on the back page, among advertisements for Holly Street junk dealers and patent medicines:

This [increase] is not so alarming as it might seem, for some of these cases had existed before and had not been reported by physicians because they had been looking for something mysterious, states Dr. Ballaine. Also, a number of the victims are now practically well.

The reassurances Bellingham physicians and health officials dispensed to the public in the early days of the epidemic came partly from their limited information regarding the disease and limited experience in treating it, particularly the most severe cases. The number of afflicted people, while growing, was still manageable and it is possible the Board of Health believed they could contain the epidemic's spread within Bellingham.

Closing orders, though widely enacted, proved to be ineffective. In the course of their daily lives people still came in close contact with
each other, shared the same spaces, touched the same objects and breathed the same air. Even when people followed the advice of health officials and avoided crowds, they still encountered others-friends, family members, neighbors, acquaintances—who did not. On October 10, the Society column of the Reveille observed: "All social and church affairs have been postponed or cancelled as a result of the mayor's proclamation. Never has it been so quiet in the social circles of Bellingham. The only thing in the social line at all are informal family dinner parties."57 From the first days under the closure order, a pattern of social life emerged to make up for the lack of movies, dances, and church gatherings. While Bellingham residents could not congregate in large numbers, they continued to socialize in private. Throughout the Spanish influenza epidemic, the society column carried notices of dinner parties—some for as many as fifteen guests—card parties, and constant visiting between local residents. Children's birthday and Halloween parties, ladies' teas and luncheons, and even a few weddings, held at home instead of in closed local churches, continued to be held throughout the weeks of the epidemic. Even if people honestly thought that gathering in public posed a hazard, they believed themselves safe from infection among family and friends.

Socializing among kith and kin was not confined to Bellingham, either; accounts of people's travels to visit relatives in greater Whatcom County, Seattle, Tacoma, and even as far as California and the Midwest, appeared in the city's newspapers. News of local enlistees visiting home from military camps, a fixture of life during wartime, continued throughout the epidemic. Such interactions undoubtedly undermined any effectiveness closing orders may have had.

Ultimately, there was no sure way to avoid influenza, and despite the closing ordinance the number of new cases in Bellingham increased slowly but steadily through mid-October. By October 21, there were 153 reported cases. On October 14, eighteen-year-old Anne Ruth Harrison, a student at the Normal School, became the first known fatality from Spanish influenza in Bellingham. Two days later Walter Earl Shanley, 25, was the second. Both, according to the local papers, had been sick for about a week.58 Shanley had enlisted in the
Engineering Corps and was home on leave when he fell ill; ten days later, his sister Mabel, aged 23, also died of the flu, leaving their parents childless. As the epidemic wore on, a pattern emerged in the Deaths and Funerals columns as unusually high numbers of young people between the ages of fifteen and forty died. While occasionally influenza was openly listed as the cause of death, it was more commonly given as an unspecified illness of five to ten days' duration.

As the number of sick and dead continued to climb, not only in Bellingham but in Seattle, Anacortes, Mount Vernon and other cities in the region, it is possible-even probable-that public health officials realized how useless closing ordinances, the use of disinfectants, wearing loose clothing and "breath[ing] pure air as much as possible" were, even as they continued to recommend these measures.\(^{59}\) Faced with a public health crisis on such an overwhelming scale, however, they had to do something, and the best they could do was try to assuage the public's anxieties. Developing vaccines against Pfeiffer's bacillus and inoculating people against the flu was a popular measure in some cities, including Seattle. It had no effect whatsoever against the influenza virus, but it may have helped prevent the opportunistic bacterial infections that led to pneumonia.\(^{60}\) Vaccines also had psychological benefits, as stated in an article in *The Literary Digest* magazine; "Whether he fights a German or a germ," the author quoted a *Boston Globe* article, "the man who worries is already half beaten... from battle to disease, the cool fighter wins."\(^{61}\) *The Survey*, a magazine aimed primarily at social and public health workers, quoted the health commissioner of Chicago. "It is our duty to keep people from fear," he declared. "Worry kills more people than the epidemic. For my part, let them wear a rabbit's foot on a watch-chain if they want it and if it will help them get rid of the physiological action of fear."\(^{62}\)

Maintaining public morale and quelling fears was as vital on the home front as it was in Europe, and many of the measures taken against the influenza make far more sense when considered as panaceas. Closure ordinances failed to control the epidemic in Boston or Philadelphia, and the Board of Health may have realized that it could
not do so in Bellingham, either. When the number of new influenza cases suddenly jumped despite the closing ordinance, with 53 cases reported on October 22, there was little left to be done. The epidemic, despite the best efforts of Bellingham's medical community and public health officials, had gained the upper hand. The number of new cases continued to grow, with 51 cases reported on October 23, then 98 on October 24.

Ordinances requiring people to wear gauze surgical masks against the flu met with varying degrees of acceptance; in cities struck early in the epidemic, such as Boston and Philadelphia doctors and nurses wore them, but citizens only did so voluntarily. San Francisco passed a universal masking ordinance on October 22 and did not repeal it until November 21. As the epidemic in Bellingham began its most virulent phase, many residents began to wear masks of their own volition, including the barbers at the Leopold Hotel. On October 28, Joe Anderson of the Owl Pharmacy told a Herald reporter that gauze masks were selling as quickly as Red Cross volunteers could make them. The following day, the Washington State Board of Health issued a masking order for the entire state. Seattle adopted it immediately, but Bellingham did not formally put it into effect until November 4---the day Austria surrendered, leaving Germany to battle the Allies alone.

Beginning on that date, the declaration required anyone in direct contact with the public to wear a surgical mask securely over the mouth and nose. The efficacy of wearing masks was doubtful, but like the closing of public gatherings and administration of vaccines it was a gesture meant to assuage fear and provide proof that at least something was being done to protect public health. The Bellingham Herald reported on November 5 that "a surgical gauze mask of not less than 5 x 6 inches in size, of not less than 20-40 mesh and not less than six layers shall be worn during the existence of the influenza epidemic." They were to be worn in all street cars, elevators, railway cars, busses, jitneys, cabs, boats, ferries or public conveyances, and in the corridors, lobbies, hallways of buildings where the public
congregates; also in all stores where groceries, drugs, or other forms of merchandise are bought and sold; in all offices and other places where business is transacted with the public, and in all restaurants and other public eating places, except that the customer need not wear a mask "while actually engaged in eating". Masks must also be worn in barber shops and in laundries, wash houses, and dry cleaning establishments and in all places where food is offered for sale, whether inside or outside a building. The proprietors of stores are required to keep their doors open and provide plenty of ventilation and at least one-third of the windows of street cars must be kept open. All public meetings are forbidden and poolrooms, cardrooms and similar places must be closed, also all soda fountains and ice cream parlors and soft drink places where glasses and utensils are not boiled after each use or where individual containers are used.  

Election officials wore masks at local polling places on November 5, but evidently not all Bellingham residents were willing to do so. Complaints from mask wearers included discomfort, awkwardness, headaches, and fogged glasses. Many women avoided wearing them for appearance's sake; like women in other cities that required masks, some probably tried to get away with heavy silk veils worn harem-style. Most of those who ignored the masking ordinance, however, probably believed masks to be useless against the flu. On November 6, the Herald reminded the public that store patrons as well as clerks were required to wear masks; despite the ordinance, many people apparently refused to comply. At the Board of Health meeting that day; "it was the consensus of the opinion that the wearing of masks should be strictly enforced by police powers and the Clerk of the Board was instructed to notify the Chief of Police to enforce the letter of the law." The Herald would later have occasion to point out that during the meeting, the only member of the Board of Health wearing a mask was City Health Officer Dr. Ballaine.

Despite the sharp surge upward in the third week of October,
the daily number of new influenza cases in Bellingham declined noticeably, even before the Board of Health enacted the state masking law. On October 27, officials reported 64 new cases. By November 6 the number had dropped to 47, then 32 on November 7, and these daily numbers continued to decline until the end of the month. The masking law, however, did not cause the decline in new flu cases. It was simply part of the etiology and course of the disease. Furthermore, given their resistance to it, a significant portion of the public seems to have been aware of this.

International events also compounded problems with the masking order. The surrender of Austria on the day the masking order went into effect contributed to the public's apparent willingness to disobey it, as well. Earlier in the war, questioning government authority—even at the local level—was often seen as divisive and unpatriotic. In a political climate that was quick to brand any dissent as potentially treasonous, it was easier to simply go along with those in authority, rather than argue with them. With the end of the war in sight, however, the willingness to make such displays of obedience to authority quickly eroded. When police arrested 22 people for masking order violations on November 8, both the citizens and newspapers lost no time in making their outrage and resentment known.70

Mayor John Sells found his office "besieged with protests" by angry citizens71 Police Chief Max Laase and the Bellingham Police Department caught the brunt of the local papers' invective on November 9. "AN UNFIT CHIEF OF POLICE", the Herald declared in a front-page headline. "OFFICIAL TYRANNY" was the unvarnished opinion of the Reveille's editor, who obliquely compared Laase to the Kaiser:

Both men and women have been arrested and thrown into jail. They have been treated like base criminals. They have been outraged by officers for no more severe a thing than that they did not cover their faces with a few square inches of gauze in deference to health officials who themselves are divided as to the efficacy of the mask! ... This is not tolerable in America. It is simply tyranny.72
The *Herald* reported that many of those arrested were already wearing masks, but did not have them adjusted properly. Police arrested an unnamed woman produce seller in the Public Market as she put her mask back on after a lunch. One man had just purchased a mask in a drugstore, when an officer took him into custody as he stood at the counter adjusting it. Police hauled in others as they lowered their masks to make telephone calls or smoke. The outrage was not only against the "draconian" and "indiscriminate" nature of the arrests, or the fact that a woman was made to sit in a jail cell for three hours for not wearing her mask correctly. "What stirred the most wrath," noted one *Herald* account," was the jailing of those who could not furnish [$25] bail. . . . There was a general feeling that no one should be required to put up bail or in default of the same be imprisoned for the first violation of the order."  

Mayor Sells immediately rescinded the masking order, and the *Herald* noted with satisfaction that "The mayor said frankly this morning that the wearing of masks is a farce." Laase claimed that he had merely tried to do his duty, and that enforcement "had simply made a lot of extra work for the police." Members of the Board of Health, who demanded strict enforcement of the masking order, somehow escaped the newspapers' wrath entirely. Both Sells and Laase were perfectly willing to shed the burden of enforcing an unpopular order handed down to them by the state and set about soothing popular outrage. They were in luck; any lingering venom against both men vanished—at least from the papers—two days later with the signing of the armistice that ended World War I. 

The war was over. The entire city turned out to celebrate, starting just after midnight on November 11 when the news came over the wire at the *Reveille* offices. From "midnight to midnight" people set off fireworks and paraded through the streets: 

That the day was to be one of parades was made manifest about 8 o'clock when more than a thousand
Pacific American Fisheries employees marched from the south side plant and took Holly Street by storm. With these men as a nucleus, the larger parade readily organized, millmen and citizens joining in.

Not only was the fighting in Europe over, but for most Bellingham residents, so was the fight against the epidemic:

With the signing of the armistice came the defeat of the "flu", Mayor Sells announcing that the ban was lifted as soon as he was advised of the end of the war at 12:30 am. Called on the phone to come down and help burn the town, the mayor responded, "Get it started, I am on my way." Arriving down town he immediately said the city would be opened and that the people will see that the flu is as decidedly defeated as the kaiser by observing special care of themselves when approached by the disease.  

Following the armistice, movie theaters and other places of public amusement reopened, churches held indoor services once again, and students returned to their schools. There was plenty of "war work" yet to be done; American troops were still in Europe and would be for a long time to come, and starving and displaced civilians desperately needed humanitarian aid. The termination of government lumber contracts meant that thousands of men working at wartime logging operations on the Olympic Peninsula would soon be available to fill labor shortages in industry. Demobilization of American troops in Europe was to be done gradually, much to the dismay of those eagerly awaiting them at home. In this context and with fewer than twenty cases reported on November 11, public concerns over the Spanish influenza epidemic subsided. Within two weeks references to it disappeared from the papers altogether.

The influenza, however, was not to be ignored. On November 27 and 28, a reminder appeared in the Reveille that the flu had not disappeared from Bellingham. The local news column contained requests on both days from Mrs. Frederick Finnegan, seeking anyone who could help care for those still sick with influenza.  

On De-
December 1, another request for help appeared, this time from the local Red Cross chapter; volunteers were needed to sew pneumonia jackets—this time for local use, not overseas.\textsuperscript{79} The influenza epidemic reemerged, not only in Bellingham but in many cities across the nation as well.\textsuperscript{80} The Bellingham school board debated another round of closings because 255 students and 17 teachers were out with the flu, and another 166 students absent due to the "influenza scare."\textsuperscript{81} Once again, the Board of Health asked people to avoid public gatherings to prevent the further spread of influenza.

Instead of issuing another closure order, the Board of Health opted for a quarantine of influenza sufferers; physicians received quarantine cards to be affixed to the front doors of infected households. Officials declared that everyone in an afflicted household must remain indoors, and none of its members could attend any kind of public gatherings, including school. Regulations permitted only the head of household or breadwinner—provided he or she was not also sick—to go to work. The number of new flu cases rose in spite of the quarantine, with 93 cases reported on December 3.\textsuperscript{82}

Mrs. Finnegan’s plea the week before for volunteer nurses was critical. While St. Joseph’s and St. Luke’s hospitals had been able to care for every patient that came through their doors, most of those ill with influenza remained at home. While there were enough doctors available, there was little physicians could do for influenza patients. Practical nursing was in far greater demand, yet large numbers of American nurses were overseas or in military hospitals. Mrs. Fred Finnegan and Mrs. R. A. Welsh did their best to organize volunteer nurses in Bellingham, but during the December wave of the epidemic the task finally proved overwhelming. The Red Cross hired Mrs. Ella Harrison, a trained nurse, to oversee the volunteer effort; she remained on the job until the number of influenza patients dwindled again in mid-February. Already mobilized to work for the war effort, the Bellingham chapter of the Red Cross and its volunteers also waged their own battle against the flu at home. Local physicians credited them with saving many lives during the course of the epidemic.\textsuperscript{83}

On December 17, the Board of Health issued another closing
order, but the public was not as cooperative as it had been the first time. Businesses closed under the first order, particularly pool halls and theaters, had already sustained heavy financial losses and were unwilling to close again, but Superintendent of Schools Elmer L. Cave, however, insisted on it. He pointed out that in any given three-day period one third of Bellingham's schoolchildren went to the movies, so to close the schools without also closing theaters was pointless. Despite objections from theater owners and other members of the business community, the Board of Health unanimously voted for closure and expected the police to enforce it, but decided not to revive the despised masking ordinance.  

Rather than lose any more business, most movie theaters and pool rooms remained open, blatantly defying the closure order. On December 18, theater owners told the Herald they would gladly obey the law, but only after receiving official notification from the Board of Health—not just word of mouth or newspaper accounts. Feeling they had been singled out unfairly, they pointed out that other businesses, as well as schools and churches, should have been included under the order. A committee of fifty businessmen formed to negotiate a modified order that would allow them to remain open as long as they limited the number of customers present at any one time. The police made no arrests of noncompliant business owners—hardly surprising after the masking-enforcement fiasco. During these closure debates, the mayor and city council remained conspicuous in their absence. While the Board of Health could issue a closing order, it consisted of four appointed physicians and a clerk; without the cooperation of the police, city council and mayor it had no way of enforcing its own orders. Against an organized group of the city's businessmen, who managed to talk both Superintendent of Schools Cave and the President of the Normal School into joining their ranks, the Board of Health's hands were tied.

The papers said nothing about the progress of the epidemic in the week following the closure order and the formation of the businessmen's committee, but local movie theaters ran large advertisements; apparently they had not received "official" orders to close.
On Christmas Eve, however, the *Reveille* presented City Health Officer Dr. Ballaine's position that the Spanish influenza had come "down upon the universe like the grasshoppers ... upon Kansas." He explained to the press that individual action and rest were more effective measures than government fiat. "Every case of influenza begins with the symptoms of a cold," he relayed to Bellingham residents. He then continued:

> When you get a cold, play safe-go home and go to bed. Stay in bed and keep warm until you are well again. And let me explain right here that 'staying in bed' does not mean toasting your feet in the kitchen oven. If your cold becomes worse and you develop a headache, then it is time to call a physician.  

The *Reveille* reporter then explained, "While Dr. Ballaine does not believe the epidemic can be stamped out by quarantine, he explains that people should not unnecessarily expose themselves to the disease as that is like hunting for trouble." The flu epidemic and public response to it in Bellingham were in marked decline yet again. While new cases continued to appear through February, and some of its victims continued to die of pneumonia into March of 1919, the worst of it was over by mid-January.

The emphasis on the best interests of the nation during wartime encouraged public cooperation with, if not full acceptance of, authority. When the influenza epidemic arrived this cooperation extended to public health officers. Bellingham residents mobilized to defeat the flu, just as they did so to defeat the Germans. But ideas about democracy, voluntarism, and proper obedience to authority that fueled propaganda against the Kaiser could also be turned on those in positions of power at home. When the Board of Health turned the campaign against influenza into a punitive display of authority, it lost crucial support among key members of the city government and the business community, as well as the general public. Without this support, it could issue all the anti-influenza decrees it wanted, but was left powerless to enforce them.

Medical and public health authorities in Bellingham, like those in
both larger and smaller communities throughout the U.S., were unable to deal effectively with the Spanish influenza epidemic. While they attempted to reassure an anxious public and prevent the spread of the disease, they ultimately met with public resentment, mistrust, and even outright rejection. They had the authority to make decisions about public health policy, but at the same time they had no real power to enforce these policies.

In the early months of 1919 there was plenty of news to steal attention away from the flu, even without a war. The demobilization of troops and temporarily high unemployment that followed; the Seattle General Strike, which prompted hundreds of striking workers to seek jobs in Bellingham; and the still-high cost of living received far more attention than the slow fade of the Spanish influenza epidemic. Its long, slow decline and disappearance, in fact, may be part of the reason why the influenza epidemic largely disappeared from local official memory, and thus local history. Despite the best efforts of health officials no means were available to decisively conquer the epidemic, so self-congratulatory accounts of how the forces of public health beat the flu could not be written. There was little physicians could do for their influenza patients, either; medical science was unable to produce preventatives, much less miracle cures. The survival of influenza victims was usually due to basic nursing care, provided by mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, and untrained volunteers as well as professional nurses. Just as historians have traditionally neglected women's activities on the home front during wartime, the mobilization of women's domestic labor into a battle against epidemic disease has also been overlooked.

Perhaps most important in forgetting, however, was the timing of the Spanish influenza epidemic. The worst of it was over by the signing of the armistice, and the next wave spent itself as American troops began to return from the far greater sufferings of the war in Europe. Set against the backdrop of war fought on a global scale, in which new technologies of warfare rendered traditional rules of engagement obsolete, cut down soldiers with mechanical efficiency, and introduced horrors previously unimagined to both combatants and civilians, the
influenza epidemic paled by comparison.

Studying the local effects of global events—World War I and the Spanish influenza epidemic—provokes questions that are beyond the immediate scope of this work. They offer potentially rich areas for further research into structures of power within the community and nation during this period, and their accompanying tensions. As Spanish influenza declined in Bellingham, for example, both the Herald and Reveille featured reports of the devastating effects of the epidemic on both Alaska Native and Pacific Islander communities. Yet during the course of the local epidemic and in the months afterward, the Bellingham papers printed not a single word about the sufferings of the Lummi people on the other side of Bellingham Bay. The refusal of many Lummi men to register for the draft made the papers, but a public health crisis on the reservation did not. What does this reveal, not only about the relationship between the city and the reservation, but about the status of Native peoples at that time? How did both war and epidemic differentially effect not only Native Americans and other disadvantaged racial groups, but also the working class and immigrants, so often accused in the papers of spreading "germs" of sedition?

The questions that arise from studying the Spanish influenza epidemic are not solely historical ones, however. It is easy to look back and see the mistakes public health officials made in 1918 and 1919, the misinformation that guided their decisions, and the lack of resources and technology at their disposal. There was, after all, no Center for Disease Control. The viruses that cause influenza had not yet been discovered, much less isolated by different strains. The production and dissemination of information about the epidemic, despite telephones and telegraph lines, proceeded too slowly to be of use to local physicians.

As this paper was being prepared for publication, news reports described a particularly virulent 2003-2004 flu season in the United States. Millions of Americans lined up for preventative flu shots, and in many parts of the country supplies of influenza vaccine ran low. The CDC hied to assuage public anxieties, but at the same time explained
the realities of creating influenza vaccines. Despite refined knowledge of flu viruses and how they mutate into different strains, the process of manufacturing flu serum is still too slow and new strains emerge too quickly. As a result, the predominant-and most virulent-strain of influenza at work, the Fujian, was not included in the current vaccines.88 While the Fujian flu is certainly not as severe as the Spanish influenza, the emergence of a new strain of flu that is just as virulent as the 1918-1919 remains a possibility—perhaps an inevitability. While medical and public health officials and institutions may have better knowledge, technology, and means of spreading information at their disposal in the early twenty-first century, a pandemic on the scale of 1918-1919 may find them faced with some of the same experiences as their predecessors faced in the early twentieth.

ENDNOTES

1 Bellingham Herald, 8 October 1918; "Influenza in City-Order Drastic Steps," Reveille, 8 October 1918; "Local Briefs," Reveille, 9 October 1918.
3 Rockafellar, "In Gauze We Trust," 105
5 "First Local Victim of Influenza is Summoned," Herald, 14 October 1918. The State Normal School is now known as Western Washington University.

6 "Grippe Shows No Increase," Herald, 21 October 1918.
7 "Bellingham to Don Influenza Masks This Week," Herald, 4 November, 1918; "State Masking Order Goes into Effect in City," Herald, 5 November 1918.
8 "22 Cases Dismissed," Herald, 9 November 1918; "City Spends Day in Celebration," Reveille, 12 November 1918, 2.
9 "Quarantine will be Enforced Against Influenza," Herald, 4 December 1918.
11 "Influenza is Like Kansas Grasshopper," Reveille, 24 December 1918, 1.
13 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace.
15 Jeffrey S. Anderson, "When We Have a Few More Epidemics the City Officials Will Awake": Philadelphia and the Influenza Epidemic of 1918-1919," Maryland Historian 27, no. 1-2 (1996), 1-26; Cockrell,"'A Blessing in Disguise'"; Richard Melzer, A Dark and Terrible Moment: The Spanish Flu Epidemic of 1918 in New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review 57, no. 3 (1982), 213-236; also Rockafellar, "In Gauze We Trust."
17 "Put Your 'Dough' Behind the Blow!," Herald, 24 September 1918; "Carry On!," Ibid., 2 October 1918. Both of these are Fourth Liberty Loan advertisements.
18 "Loca!Briefs," Herald, 18 April 1918;
20 "Our Boys Who Are Now in the Service of Uncle Sam," Herald, 1 September, 1918. Photos of local servicemen presented under this headline were a regular feature on the front page in the fall of 1918.
21 New York Dentists advertisement, Herald, 6 September 1918 (The advertisement reminds local men to register for the draft on 12 September.);
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24 Reveille, 19 February 1918, 4.
25 Reveille, 21 April 1918.
26 Reveille, 12-19 January 1918; Kennedy, Over Here, 123-124.
28 Reveille, 10 and 26 January 1919 (food prices); Reveille, 11 April 1919.
(wages).

29 Kennedy, Over Here, 165.
30 Ibid., 269.
31 Ibid., 163-165.
32 Reveille, 14 April 1918, 1.
33 Reveille, 19 January 1918, 4.
34 Herald, 14 September 1918.
35 Herald, 28 September 1918.
36 "Influenza Spreads Alarmingly", Herald, 4 October 1918.
37 Reveille, 4 October 1918.
38 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 57; Rockafellar, "In Gauze We Trust", 105.
39 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 92.
43 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 264.
44 "Extent and Control of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic", Survey, 19 October 1918, 63-64.
45 Rockafellar, "In Gauze We Trust," 105.
46 "New Disease Threatens Nation," Reveille, 6 October 1918, 4.
47 Herald, 8 October 1918; "Influenza in City- Order Drastic Steps," Reveille, 8 October 1918; "Local Briefs," Reveille, 9 October 1918.
48 "New Store is Viewed by Many," Reveille, 11 October 1918.
49 Herald, 8 October 1918.
50 "Practical Observations Given on Influenza and How to Combat It," Reveille, 11 October 1918.
51 "Disease Develops Slowly Here; Two New Cases," Herald, 9 October 1918.
52 "Spanish Influenza Only Grippe, Says Ballaine," Herald, 10 October 1918.
53 "Influenza Situation at Seattle Shows Improvement," Herald, 10 October 1918.
54 "Practical Observations Given on Influenza Aid to Combat It," Reveille, 11 October, 1918.
55 "313 New Influenza Cases Reported at Seattle," Herald, 9 October 1918.
56 "Influenza Cases Increase in City," Herald, 11 October 1918, 8.
58 "First Local Victim of Influenza Is Summoned," *Herald*, 14 October 1918, 8; "No Sign of Lifting Quarantine in Sight In City," *Herald*, 16 October 1918, 5.
59 "Practical Observations Given on Influenza Aid to Combat It," *Reveille*, 11 October, 1918.
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61 "How to Fight Spanish Influenza," *Literary Digest*, 12 October 1918, 13-14.
62 George M. Price, M.D., "Influenza-Destroyer and Teacher" *Survey*, 21 December 1918, 367-368.
63 "Local Briefs," *Herald*, 28 October 1918.
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65 "State Masking Order Goes into Effect in City," *Herald*, 5 November 1918.
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70 "22 Cases Dismissed; Order Rescinded by Mayor," *Herald*, 9 November 1918.
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74 "22 Cases Dismissed," *Herald*, 9 November 1918.
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